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If one were to erect a monument to commemorate Indonesia's much-celebrated 
"reformasi" (reformation) and transition from authoritarian rule, the motto might well 
read "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back." Removing Suharto from power was 
certainly one step in the direction of democratization, but it was by no means 
sufficient. Meaningful democratization would also require fundamental changes to the 
pillars of his authoritarian rule. Five years after Suharto's resignation, despite 
uncertainty, internal conflicts, and temporary setbacks, the central pillar of the New 
Order—the Indonesian military—has carried out internal consolidation and re-emerged 
as one of the most powerful institutions in the country. Two recent books published by 
RoutledgeCurzon Press explore the changing position of the military during and after 
Suharto's New Order.
Kingsbury's book, Power Politics and the Indonesian Military, seeks "to indicate or to 
reinforce the idea of the existence of a pattern or patterns of behavior" on the part of 
the Indonesian military "over a long period of time, despite what appear to be external 
changes and short-term rationalisations of particular events." (Kingsbury, p. 3) "The 
central thesis of this book," the author writes,
is that the state of the Republic of Indonesia is not viable without the active 
involvement of the TNI in its political and security activities, which are 
inextricably linked.... The state and the TNI's current role within it are mutually 
dependent: the state cannot maintain its territorial integrity without unity being 
imposed by the TNI, and the TNI cannot exist in its present form without the 
demands of a potentially or actually fragmented state, (ibid., p. 12)
This argument is developed in six chapters, with the titles "The problematic role of the 
TNI" (covering philosophical origins, military doctrine, and state organization); 
"Context, continuity and change" (on theoretical issues of power, empire, and 
militarization of the state under Sukarno and Suharto); "The functional structure of the 
TNI" (combines description of the service branches with anecdotal material from Aceh,
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East Timor, and Irian Jaya); "Factions, reform and reassertion" (on the political 
position and role of the military during Indonesia's partial transition from 
authoritarian rule); "The political economy of the TNI" (covering military-business 
links); and a concluding chapter "The more things change ..."
Unfortunately, the book is marred by a wide range of errors. There are hundreds of 
distracting, incorrect spellings. Some of these are of ordinary English words and names 
("furore" instead of "furor," "posses" instead of "possess," "Bennedict" instead of 
"Benedict," etc.); others are of Indonesian words ("Ordre" rather than "Orde," 
"Baden" rather than "Badan," "Termpimpin" instead of "Terpimpin," "Permetsa" 
instead of "Permesta," "puti" instead of "putih," etc.) and proper names ("Wiraha di 
Kusumah" instead of "Wirahadikusumah," "Ryamisard" instead of "Ryamizard," 
"Yayak" instead of "Yayat," etc.). Still others are Portuguese words and names 
("Joao" rather than "Joao," "Gusmao" instead of "Gusmao," "Uniao Democratca de 
Timor" instead of "Uniao Democratica Timorense") and even Tetun words ("Mahau" 
instead of "mauhu"). Further confusion stems from the haphazard listing in the 
glossary, in which full names of some acronyms are provided but not others. There are 
also a host of poor and incorrect translations of Indonesian acronyms and terms. 
"Angkatan Darat" is at times translated as "Army" and other times as "Land Force," 
"Oknum" meaning "rogue," is misleadingly translated as "'involved'/military 
gangster," and "sewewang-wenang" is translated as "arbitrary ruthlessness."
More worrisome is that the seventy-three page chapter on the structure of the 
military misrepresents many of the most basic features of the Indonesian military. For 
example, the author explains that:
each Kodam is divided into smaller administrative units, each of which 
corresponds to one of the civil administrative divisions, as follows: Military 
Resort (Garrison) Command (Komando Resort Militer—Korem), with at least one 
battalion, which corresponds to the sub-provincial district (kabupaten), Military 
District Command (Komando Distrik Militer -  Kodim), which corresponds to the 
sub-district (kecamatan), and Military Area Command (Komando Rayon 
Militer—Koramil), which corresponds to the local level (kelurahan). (ibid., p. 85)
Garrisons, of course, are not Korem but are part of the Kodam. Furthermore, Korem 
generally correspond to either a province (as in Bengkulu or Bali) or the old Dutch 
residencies, not to kabupaten; Kodim correspond to Districts, not kecamatan, and 
Koramil correspond to kecamatan, not kelurahan. But disregarding his own explanation, 
the author then claims that there were thirteen Koramil in East Timor, when in fact 
there were thirteen Kodim. Basic confusion also arises over Kostrad (which the author 
claims is "stationed throughout the archipelago," when in fact Kostrad units are all 
headquartered on Java with the exception of the 3r Airborne Brigade, which is based 
in South Sulawesi) and Kopassus. (The author incorrectly claims that "SGI" was part 
of Kopassus and that Group V is equivalent to Detasemen 81, and offers the bizarre 
explanation that "[t]he involvement of Kopassus in East Timor dates back to the very 
first days of Indonesia's involvement in the territory, and the involvement of its 
forerunner, Kopassandha, goes back even further to before Indonesia's invasion in 
December 1975." [ibid., p. 115]). Equally serious is the author's assertion that in 1999
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the territorial structure was expanded from the previous ten Kodam to seventeen 
Kodam. In fact, to date only two new Kodam have been created, one in Aceh and the 
other covering the provinces of Maluku and North Maluku.
Much of this confusion may stem from the author's sources. He mostly disregards 
the large body of solid research on the Indonesian military, and often misrepresents 
those studies that are cited. Over one-third of the sources cited in the bibliography are 
from the print media, of which the most commonly cited is the Jakarta Post online. As 
the author explains in the introduction, he also relies heavily on his own interviews and 
interactions in East Timor, Aceh, Papua, Ambon, and elsewhere. The author's reliance 
on the media and interviews leads to a book that is chock full of the phrases "was 
identified as being," "it has been alleged," "which the locals attributed to," and "some 
sources claimed." Allegations, attributions, and claims are all interesting, of course, but 
only insofar as they are either verified or studied as a window into military and/or 
civilian perceptions. The author does neither.
What, then, of the author's argument? Despite Kingsbury's admirable goal of 
"challenging the preconceptions that underpin military power in Indonesia," the 
author's thesis—"the state of the Republic of Indonesia is not viable without the active 
involvement of the TNI"—unwittingly replicates the Indonesian military's own 
argument that it is the only institution capable of preserving the Unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia. Rather, a complete withdrawal of the Indonesian military from 
Aceh, Maluku, and Papua would be the surest means of reestablishing the eroded 
legitimacy of the state.
By contrast, Jun Honna's book is a model of detailed research, judicious analysis, 
and clear prose. The author innovatively combines two of the most important 
approaches to the study of the Indonesian military. On the one hand, Honna explores 
the interaction between doctrinal debates and discourse both within the military and 
between the military and "political society." On the other hand, Honna highlights how, 
over the last decade of the New Order and the first three years of the post-Suharto era, 
this discourse contributed to rivalries and factionalism within the military. To do so, he 
relies on a close reading of official military writings on doctrine as well as on essays 
written by individual officers, speeches, and statements to the press.
The first five chapters explore major themes in military discourse during the New 
Order, with particular emphasis on the last decade of Suharto's rule. Chapter 2 
examines how "the struggle between Soeharto and [General] Moerdani" created 
political space in which civilians could raise the issue of dwifungsi (dual function), and 
Chapter 3 documents military responses to its eroding legitimacy and the role of 
"professional" and "reformist" officers. Chapter 4 focuses on the emergence of human 
rights discourse, debates over the "security approach," and the military's response. 
Chapter 5 is a fascinating exploration of "ideological dogmatization" associated with 
the rise of hard-line officers closely linked to President Suharto. Finally, Chapter 6 
investigates the emergence of internal military debate over the implementation of 
dwifungsi in the 1990s, with particular attention paid to the military's legislative 
presence, electoral participation, and military-ABRI relations. This thematic approach 
not only allows close scrutiny of different themes and issue areas, but also serves as a
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means to demonstrate that military openness to political change on one front may be 
coupled with intransigence and even retreats on other fronts. Paradoxically, the minute 
analysis of internal military publications and discourse about the political role of the 
military partially constrains Honna's analysis to what politicians, military officers, 
academics, activists and religious leaders thought or said, with little on their own 
involvement in the areas under debate (human rights accountability, for example).
In contrast to the thematic chapters on the late New Order, the final chapter 
presents a largely chronological account of "the fall of Soeharto and the aftermath" 
(until Abdurrachman Wahid's removal from the presidency in July 2001). The close 
analysis of events during this three-year period would not have been possible without 
the sustained analysis of the previous chapters. The great strength of this chapter is in 
demonstrating that military response to democratic demands was neither monolithic 
nor constant, but it varied in relation to internal power struggles. One wishes, however, 
for a more extended account of Suharto's fall (which is covered in a mere three and 
one-half pages) and a more convincing explanation of what Honna calls "Wiranto's 
political autonomy." But observers of Indonesia will be well served to remember 
Honna's conclusion that the military's response to democratic pressure has been 
characterized by both "accommodation and repression."
Throughout the book, Honna's focus is almost exclusively on Jakarta. Regional 
issues—including military influence at the provincial level and below, the occupation of 
East Timor, military operations and troop deployments, ethnic and religious conflicts, 
systematic human rights violations, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, etc.—are 
only mentioned when they impinge on discourse concerning the military, and even then 
only briefly. Indeed, the author seems to be at pains to avoid discussing what he terms 
"events." The military-sponsored massacres in 1965-66 are referred to in the most 
opaque language: "The PKI ... was quickly eliminated" (Honna, p. 9), "the defeat of 
the PKI" (ibid., p. 54), and the "elimination of [the] PKI" (ibid., p. 110). The reader is 
never told that the Indonesian military invaded East Timor, and oddly Fretilin/Falintil 
are termed a "separatist movement." (ibid., pp. 9 and 209) Nor would the reader 
know that under Suharto the Indonesian military had engaged in a ten-year 
counterinsurgency campaign in West Kalimantan, more than three decades of military 
campaigns in Irian Jaya, and in large-scale military operations in Aceh during the late 
1970s and throughout the 1990s, and that major ethnic violence broke out in West 
Kalimantan prior to Suharto's resignation, and that additional regional violence raged 
at different times in Maluku, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and elsewhere.
The few specific references to regional issues are also marred by odd factual errors. 
Honna claims that in 1998 General Wiranto "announced ABRI's decision to reduce the 
troops deployed in East Timor, Irian Jaya and Aceh, and terminated the status of the 
Military Operations Zone, or Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM), which had been imposed 
on the three regions since the late 1980s" (ibid., p. 165). There were indeed important 
troop withdrawals from all three areas, but a careful reading of Wiranto's statements 
at the time reveals that he avoided mentioning DOM precisely because no such thing 
existed. Other errors of detail include references to Kodim Wiradharma rather than 
Korem 164/Wira Dharma (ibid., p. 98), plans to open East Timor in the early 1990s, 
although this was done in December 1988 (ibid., p. 99), the 572nd Trikora battalion
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rather than Battalion 752/Vira Yudha Sakti in Irian Jaya (ibid., p. 100), the killing of 
over one hundred NU leaders in 1998, when in fact NU documents show that the 
victims of the "santet" killings were not NU leaders of kyai (ibid., p. 170). Indeed, one 
suspects that slightly less doctrinal and textual analysis and more attention to local 
military entrenchment might have yielded more insights into Indonesia's stalled 
democratic project.
Nevertheless, this book is a major contribution to our understanding of the 
Indonesian military and transitions from authoritarian rule more generally. This work 
will be particularly valuable for specialists in the field of civil-military relations and 
academics writing on the Indonesian military. Given the large number of military 
acronyms and abbreviations (not all of which are explained in the text or included in 
the glossary), the thematic chapters will be harder reading for non-experts. For the 
general reader, the chapter on changing civil-military relations since Suharto's 
resignation will be of most use in understanding the Habibie and Wahid presidencies, 
in evaluating current developments under Megawati Sukarnoputri, and, one suspects, 
in understanding the unfolding competition for the 2004 national elections.
